Four meanings of outcome
Forge uses the word outcome for four different things. Qualify it when you write about one.The two tables
outcomeDefinitions — what a claim means
An immutable row declaring the facts an outcome needs and the rules that turn them into a status.
Immutability is the point: a binding pins
(definitionKey, version), so a claim already made about a
completed run can never have its meaning rewritten underneath it.
outcomeBindings — who may fulfill it
A row attaching one definition version to one pinned workflowVersions row, and mapping each
declared fact to a source.
A mapping may also declare
evidenceKind: "approval" | "file" so the claim links to the human
approval or the produced artifact that backs it.
Status rules
Rules are evaluated top-down and the first row whose every condition matches wins. The last row must have an emptywhen — an unconditional terminator — so every possible fact set resolves to
exactly one status. Authoring rejects a rule set without one.
Two rules worth internalizing before authoring:
A missing optional fact makes every condition on it false — except
empty, which is true.
“There were no exceptions” and “there is no exceptions list” are the same claim to an operator.What a run produces
Materialization is scheduled for every completed production run. The workflow engine knows nothing about outcomes — it does not check whether one is expected.- No active binding → no row is written, and the run reports
not_declared. This is the ordinary case for most workflows, not an error. - N active bindings → N outcome rows for that attempt, keyed by definition. Run surfaces show the worst status across them.
Authoring and permissions
Creating and retiring outcome definitions, and attaching and retiring bindings, all requireobjectives:manage. It is deliberately separate from workflows:manage: authoring a workflow and
deciding what that workflow is allowed to claim are different powers. Grant it to people, not to
agents: an agent that could author a definition could author the standard its own run is measured
against.
When a workflow publishes a new version, every active binding is re-validated against it. A binding
that still resolves is carried forward automatically; one that no longer resolves is not carried,
and an audit event records why. A workflow that keeps claiming outcomes off renamed-away fields
would be worse than one that stops claiming.
Trust receipts
Every outcome carries a trust receipt: a canonicalized (RFC 8785 JCS) record of the identity, authority, credentials, capabilities, models, decisions, cost, and artifact lineage behind the run, plus a SHA-256 digest of itself. Where a signing key is configured, the receipt is additionally signed with Ed25519 over that same digest and reportssigned: true. Signing is deterministic, so re-reading an outcome returns a
byte-identical receipt. A deployment with no key still serves receipts with signed: false — the
digest still binds the contents, but nothing attests to origin.
To verify an exported receipt: remove integrity.digest, canonicalize with JCS, SHA-256 the result,
and compare. Then, if signed, verify the signature over the raw bytes of that digest with the
published key. Exports include these instructions inline.
Workflow run certificates
Forge also has a separaterun-trust-receipt/v1 certificate contract for an individual workflow
run attempt. It binds the attempt’s terminal result and observed evidence without requiring an
outcome definition or binding. The certificate records observation time, provenance, and coverage
for each evidence section; missing attribution remains explicit.
The exact stored envelope contains payload and integrity. Forge signs the raw SHA-256 digest
of the RFC 8785 canonicalized payload with Ed25519. Verification checks the closed payload and
envelope shapes, digest, signature, and trusted deployment/key identity. This protocol differs
from the outcome receipt described above. A failed run may have a valid certificate, and a valid
signature does not imply complete evidence.
Error summaries use the shared run-content masking policy before they are frozen and signed.
Reads return that exact signed account. Decision evidence remains partial when Forge cannot prove
that every approval producer was captured, even when all recorded canonical decisions were read.
Terminal integration preserves newly ended attempts for asynchronous issuance, including failed,
cancelled, test, delegated, and personal-assistant runs. Historical discovery requests certificates
for known retained terminal attempts in bounded passes. Those certificates report retrospective
provenance and their actual issuance time; missing history is not reconstructed.
Certificate reads follow the source run’s permissions and retention. Actual source deletion also
removes its stored certificates and requests; public verification keys remain retained. Exports
can still be verified with a separately trusted archived public key. The existing outcome receipt
and machine dossier contracts above remain unchanged.
The Console Runs surface provides receipt access from run lists and the
run canvas. Deployment signing readiness and completed issuance determine availability; code
deployment alone does not prove that a live certificate exists.
